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Background: In the Netherlands, echovirus type 6 (E6) 
is identified through clinical and environmental enter-
ovirus surveillance (CEVS and EEVS). Aim: We aimed 
to identify E6 transmission clusters and to assess the 
role of EEVS in surveillance and early warning of E6. 
Methods: We included all E6 strains from CEVS and 
EEVS from 2007 through 2016. CEVS samples were 
from patients with enterovirus illness. EEVS sam-
ples came from sewage water at pre-specified sam-
pling points. E6 strains were defined by partial VP1 
sequence, month and 4-digit postcode. Phylogenetic 
E6 clusters were detected using pairwise genetic dis-
tances. We identified transmission clusters using a 
combined pairwise distance in time, place and phy-
logeny dimensions. Results: E6 was identified in 157 
of 3,506 CEVS clinical episodes and 92 of 1,067 EEVS 
samples. Increased E6 circulation was observed in 
2009 and from 2014 onwards. Eight phylogenetic 
clusters were identified; five included both CEVS and 
EEVS strains. Among these, identification in EEVS 
did not consistently precede CEVS. One phylogenetic 
cluster was dominant until 2014, but genetic diversity 
increased thereafter. Of 14 identified transmission 
clusters, six included both EEVS and CEVS; in two of 
them, EEVS identification preceded CEVS identifica-
tion. Transmission clusters were consistent with phy-
logenetic clusters, and with previous outbreak reports. 
Conclusion: Algorithms using combined time–place–
phylogeny data allowed identification of clusters not 
detected by any of these variables alone. EEVS iden-
tified strains circulating in the population, but EEVS 
samples did not systematically precede clinical case 
surveillance, limiting EEVS usefulness for early warn-
ing in a context where E6 is endemic.
Background
Enteroviruses (EVs) are viruses of 
the  Picornaviridae  family mainly transmitted via the 
faecal–oral route, but also through eye, nose, and 
mouth secretions. Humans are the only reservoir of the 
four species classified A to D, within which more than 
100 types have been described [1]. For public health 
purposes, EVs are mainly classified into polioviruses 
and non-polio EVs (NPEVs). As the polio eradication 
approaches, NPEVs are receiving increased attention 
as sources of morbidity and mortality [2,3], being the 
most common cause of viral central nervous system 
(CNS) infections [4-8]. They can present as sporadic 
cases or as clusters or even cause large outbreaks 
involving severe cases with neurological or respiratory 
complications [1-3]. Echovirus type 6 (E6, EV-B species) 
detections have been increasing in recent years in the 
Netherlands, where it caused 13% of all NPEV infections 
in 2016 [9,10]. It is one of the most frequently detected 
types circulating in Europe [8,11-13] and other regions 
[14-17], and has been implicated in meningitis outbreaks 
[10,18-21].
The World Health Organization [22] suggests three 
reasons for EV surveillance unrelated to polio eradi-
cation: to detect and respond to outbreaks, to estab-
lish disease burden data for public health planning, 
and to perform virological investigation and research. 
Serotyping and characterisation of circulating NPEVs, 
including rapid identification and close monitoring of 
emerging strains, is of public health relevance [23]. In 
the Netherlands, poliovirus surveillance is performed 
through clinical EV surveillance (CEVS), mainly in stool 
samples [9,24], complemented with environmental EV 
surveillance (EEVS) in sewage water [24]. Exclusion of 
poliovirus is based on virus isolation and sequencing 
of EV-positive samples. Results of both surveillance 
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systems also provide valuable information on circulat-
ing NPEVs.
In the past, EEVS demonstrated to be more sensitive 
than surveillance based on clinical cases alone [24,25]. 
NPEVs isolates from EEVS are also phylogenetically 
related to clinical isolates, suggesting its potential 
for characterising the extent of NPEVs circulation and 
diversity [13,14,24,26,27] or recognising outbreaks 
[15,27]. More importantly, as demonstrated for polio-
virus [28], NPEV infections have been preceded by 
silent circulation of the same strain in the environment 
[14,26,29,30], suggesting a role of EEVS in early warn-
ing. Incorporating data on time and space in the phy-
logenetic analysis could help investigate the relation 
between environmental and clinical NPEVs strains, and 
assess if EEVS captures ongoing transmission chains 
and could act as early warning.
The public health importance of E6, together with its 
detectability in sewage water [14,15,24], make it a good 
candidate to evaluate the full potential of environmen-
tal EV surveillance. Our objective was to identify trans-
mission clusters of E6 in the Netherlands using time, 
place and phylogeny data of clinical and environmen-
tal strains, with the final goal of assessing the added 
value of environmental surveillance in general and, 
specifically, for early warning of E6 outbreaks.
Methods
Design and setting
We included all E6-positive clinical cases and envi-
ronmental samples identified from 2007 through 
2016 within CEVS and EEVS. Data from CEVS was 
anonymised. Both surveillance systems have been 
previously described [9,24,31]. Briefly, for the CEVS, 
samples from patients with EV-related illness are ana-
lysed at clinical laboratories. Laboratories are strongly 
advised to send positive samples to the National 
Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) 
or to a TypeNed laboratory for typing and exclusion of 
poliovirus [31]. RIVM predominantly receives samples 
from the central part of the Netherlands. EEVS is per-
formed in sewage water from secondary schools or 
residential areas in regions at higher risk of poliovi-
rus introduction, in the area known as the bible belt, 
where the uptake of vaccination is low because of reli-
gious beliefs [32]. In addition, ad hoc locations can be 
included, for example, downstream from asylum seeker 
centres [24] or from the residence of known shed-
ders [33]. Samples are collected approximately every 
6 weeks, varying by season or following polio alerts 
[24,33,34]. Samples from CEVS typed at the RIVM rea-
sonably overlap with the areas covered by the EEVS.
Laboratory methods
Laboratory procedures for the surveillance systems 
have been previously described in detail [24]. Briefly, 
RNA was isolated from sewage water cultures with 
positive cytopathic effect and 5’ UTR RT-PCR-positive 
clinical samples by automated extraction using the 
LC Nucleic Acid isolation kit (MagnaPure96, Roche, 
Almere, the Netherlands). RNA was eluted in 50 µL elu-
tion buffer and amplified in the semi-nested RT-PCR 
described by Nix et al. [35]. The sensitivity of this 
RT-PCR, defined as the equivalent of the lowest dose 
of cultured infectious virus detected by this RT-PCR, 
was 0.126 50% tissue culture infective dose (TCID50) 
for EV-B (prototype virus coxsackievirus B3). The 350–
400 nt fragments of the VP1 gene were purified using 
ExoSAP-IT and sequenced at Baseclear (Leiden, the 
Netherlands). The partial VP1 sequences were edited 
using BioNumerics version 7.1 and used as input in the 
Table
Number of samples analysed within the clinical and environmental enterovirus surveillance systems, the Netherlands, 
2007–2016 (n=4,795)
Number of samples analysed Samples positive for E6
n % (column) n % (row)
CEVS: sample
Faecal 2,847 76.4 109 3.8
Respiratory 403 10.8 6 1.5
Cerebrospinal fluid 362 9.7 44 12.2
Other 96 2.6 1 1.0
Unknown 20 0.5 0 0.0
Total 3,728 100 160 4.3 a
EEVS: sampling point
13 villages 451 42.3 38 8.4
11 schools 428 40.0 43 10.1
1 asylum seeker centre 188 17.4 11 5.9
Total 1,067 100 92 8.6 b
CEVS: clinical enterovirus surveillance system; EEVS: environmental enterovirus surveillance system; E6: echovirus type 6.
a Multiple samples allowed per patient, therefore the total number of positive samples is higher that total number of positive cases (160 
positive samples in 157 cases).
b In one sample two distinct E6 types were identified, therefore total number of distinct E6 strains isolated in the environment is 93.
3www.eurosurveillance.org
EV genotyping tool (http://www.rivm.nl/mpf/enterovi-
rus/typingtool/), which has an automated algorithm 
to assign the species and (sub)type of the sequences 
entered [36].
Data analysis
Distribution of E6 strains across time, place and phy-
logeny was described. Date of sample collection was 
used or, if missing, date of reception at RIVM. Samples 
from the same patient within 10 days were consid-
ered as a single episode. E6 strains were described by 
source (clinical or environmental) and month. Dot maps 
represented geographical location of strains as a ran-
dom point within the polygon of the four-digit postcode 
(PC4) or, if missing, the municipality. For environmental 
samples, we used the location of the sewage sampling 
point and for clinical samples, the location of patients’ 
residence or, if missing, of the clinical laboratory.
Phylogenetic analysis was based on partial VP1 gene. 
The Enterovirus-B echovirus type 6 D’Amori strain 
GenBank no. AY302558 was used for sequence align-
ment using MEGA 7.0.21. Sequences were omitted if 
they were shorter than 270 nt or if they overlapped only 
partially with the fragment from position 2,611 to 2,881. 
Phylogenetic trees were built using the maximum-like-
lihood method with 1,000 bootstrap replicates and a 
threshold of 70%. Genetic diversity was assessed by 
pairwise distribution [37]. We used a genetic threshold 
of 15% to define subtype-specific phylogenetic clusters 
using Cluster Picker 1.2.4 [38].
We analysed E6 transmission clusters by applying the 
algorithm developed by Ypma et al. [39]. Briefly, it 
uses pairwise distances in time, place and phylogeny 
to calculate the relative distance in each dimension 
between any two cases (i.e. number of cases between 
any two cases in an ordered distance sequence) and 
multiplies the three dimensions to obtain a combined 
distance measure. A hierarchical clustering tree is con-
structed by sequentially connecting pairs of cases with 
the smallest distance, resulting in a clustering tree in 
which length of the branches represents the combined 
distance. Significance of the clusters given their height 
and size is calculated by bootstrapping methods [39]. 
In this study we considered clusters with p < 0.05. In 
addition, we chose a cut-off value of the tree height at 
15% below which clusters are identified. This cut-off is 
set ad hoc and is guided by a plausibility assessment 
of the identified clusters, including the analysis of 
intra-cluster correlation and inter-case distances (algo-
rithm available on github.com/lsoetens/ClusterViz/). 
Finally, we described the distribution of the identified 
transmission clusters across time, place and phylog-
eny. Analyses were performed using R 3.4.0.
Accession numbers
VP1 partial sequences were deposited in GenBank; the 
accession numbers are listed in the Supplement.
Figure 1
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B. Proportion of samples with detection of E6 by source (N=250)
E6: echovirus type 6.
Panel A: Total number of E6 detections and total number of samples analysed per month from the environmental and the clinical surveillance 
systems. Panel B: Percentage of samples positive for E6 among the total number of samples by month.
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Results
Description of samples from the clinical and 
environmental enterovirus surveillance
Between 2007 and 2016, RIVM received 1,067 sew-
age water samples from 25 locations within EEVS, and 
3,728 samples from 3,506 clinical episodes in 3,452 
patients within CEVS (Table). E6 was detected in 92 
(8.6%) samples from EEVS. There was one sample with 
two distinct E6 viruses, therefore a total of 93 differ-
ent E6 isolates were analysed. E6 was detected in 157 
(4.5%) clinical episodes, hereafter referred to as cases. 
Of all episodes, 1,756 (50%) were male, 1,332 (38%) 
female and 418 (12%) of unknown sex, with similar pro-
portions of E6 positivity (chi-squared test: p = 0.335). 
Median age (based on 3,124 episodes) was 3.1 months 
overall (interquartile range (IQR): 1.0 months–2.5 years) 
and 4.3 months in E6 cases (IQR: 0.9 months–18.3 
years; Mann–Whitney U test: p = 0.339).
Distribution of echovirus type 6 strains across 
time, place and phylogeny
E6 showed long periods of low incidence with peaks of 
increased circulation in 2009 and from 2014 onwards, 
compatible with an epidemic pattern (Figure 1). The 
number of EV-positive samples received for typing 
within the CEVS was variable, with peaks in the num-
ber of samples received coinciding with peaks in E6 
detections. The variability in the number of sewage 
water samples was lower. To remove this interference, 
we calculated the proportion of samples positive for 
E6 in both systems. After doing that, the increase in 
2014 was more evident in sewage than in clinical 
cases (Figure 1). No periodic pattern or long-term trend 
was evident. Importantly, there was no evidence that 
increases in environmental detections of E6 preceded 
the occurrence of clinical cases.
PC4 or municipality was available for all environmental 
surveillance locations and for 124 cases; for the remain-
ing 33 cases, the PC4 of the virology laboratory was 
used. E6 cases were widely distributed in the central 
part of the country (Figure 2), matching the area cov-
ered by the CEVS and the EEVS. No evident geographi-
cal clustering was present overall, nor when looking at 
individual years (data not shown).
Partial VP1 sequences encompassing at least 270 nt 
were available for 188 isolates: 58 (62%) environmen-
tal and 130 (83%) clinical isolates. Eight phylogenetic 
clusters were identified (Figure 3  and Supplement 
Figure S1). Two contained only environmental isolates: 
cluster 2 (n = 6) and cluster 8 (n = 2) and one contained 
only clinical isolates: cluster 4 (n = 3). Five clusters 
included both: cluster 1 (31 environmental and 75 clini-
cal isolates), cluster 3 (nine environmental and 30 clini-
cal isolates), cluster 6 (three environmental and four 
clinical isolates), cluster 5 (three environmental and 
three clinical isolates) and cluster 7 (two environmental 
and one clinical isolate). There were 14 clinical isolates 
and two environmental isolates that did not belong to 
any phylogenetic cluster.
Cluster 1 was the dominant strain up to late 2014, with 
simultaneous detections in EEVS and CEVS (Figure 
4). In 2015 and 2016, other phylogenetic clusters 
appeared. Cluster 3 appeared first in an environmental 
sample in October 2014, followed by a clinical case in 
November 2014, and again in the EEVS in June 2015 fol-
lowed by the CEVS from July 2015 onwards. Cluster 5 
appeared first in a clinical sample in December 2015 
and was thereafter detected in other clinical cases 
and in the EEVS. Also cluster 6 was first detected in 
a clinical case in November 2015 and then sporadi-
cally during 2016 in other clinical cases and the EEVS. 
Cluster 7 appeared simultaneously in the CEVS and 
EEVS in August 2016. All phylogenetic clusters were 
geographically dispersed throughout the Netherlands 
(Supplement Figure S2).
Figure 2
Geographical distribution of echovirus type 6 in clinical 





Red dots: clinical samples; blue dots: environmental samples. 
Boundaries represent municipalities, points represent random 
locations for cases within the 4-digit postcode polygon, and 
shaded grey areas represent 4-digit postcodes from which at least 




Using the time–place–phylogeny clustering algorithm, 
we identified 14 transmission clusters (designated A to 
N) comprising 122 (65%) isolates. Most transmission 
clusters were dense in time, place and genetics, with 
the exception of clusters J, K, N and M, which showed 
a significantly larger variation on the geographical 
dimension than the non-clustered isolates (however 
geographical distances in the Netherlands are small) 
(Supplement Figure S3). In addition, clusters C, D, E 
and H showed high intra-cluster correlation, indicating 
large internal cohesion in these clusters (Supplement 
Figure S4). For the other transmission clusters, the 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient between pair-
wise dimensions was either non-existent, very low, 
non-significant or could not be estimated because of 
zero variance in one or both dimensions.
Seven transmission clusters (A, C, D, H, J, L, N) were 
identified within phylogenetic cluster 1, and four (B, 
E, F, I) within phylogenetic cluster 3. Cluster N was 
the one responsible for the E6 peak of 2009, together 
with a few cases from transmission cluster H (Figure 
5). Phylogenetic cluster 2 as a whole was identified as 
transmission cluster G and was the most robust cluster. 
Cluster K comprised isolates from phylogenetic cluster 
4 along with isolates that were not part of a cluster 
based on phylogeny alone. Possible spurious cluster-
ing was identified by analysing within-cluster genetic 
distance (Supplement Table S1). In cluster J, very high 
genetic distance (21.5%) was identified between just 
one isolate (from phylogenetic cluster 4) and the rest 
of isolates (from phylogenetic cluster 1). After exclud-
ing this sequence, the maximum intra-cluster genetic 
distance was 1.3%. In cluster C, maximum distance 
was 8.3%, but decreased to 0% after the exclusion 
of one sequence. Cluster M, had pairwise distances 
higher than 1.5% (corresponding to 4 nt difference) in 
78% of the pairs, corresponding to isolates from phy-
logenetic clusters 3, 5, 6 and 7. Cluster M also had the 
highest distances in phylogeny and time, spanning 12 
months, as well as large geographical distance (Figure 
5, Supplement Figures S4 and S6).
Figure 3
Phylogenetic tree of echovirus type 6 sequences in the VP1 positions 2,611–2,881, depicting eight identified phylogenetic 
clusters and 14 transmission clusters, the Netherlands, 2007–2016 (n = 188)
Maximum-likelihood method with 1000 bootstrap replicates, analysed in MEGA 7.0.21.
Red dots: echovirus type 6 isolates from environmental samples (n = 58) and black dots from clinical samples (n = 130). Background colours 
represent phylogenetic clusters. Letters represent transmission clusters.
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Six of the 14 transmission clusters included both envi-
ronmental and clinical isolates (E, H, J–M), another 
six contained only clinical isolates (A–D, I, N) and 
two included only environmental isolates (F and G), 
although cluster G corresponded to the asylum seeker 
centre, for which no clinical information was available. 
Only in two (E and L) of the six transmission clusters 
including both clinical and environmental isolates the 
environmental E6 detection preceded the detection in 
CEVS.
Discussion
In the Netherlands, E6 presented an epidemic pat-
tern, with dispersed geographical distribution and 
increasing genetic diversity. Environmental and clini-
cal samples belonged to joint phylogenetic clusters 
and, to a lesser extent, to joint transmission clusters, 
confirming the usefulness of environmental surveil-
lance to characterise E6 strains causing disease in 
human populations. However, there was no indication 
that environmental detections systematically preceded 
detection through surveillance based on clinical cases.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to jointly ana-
lyse environmental and clinical samples of EVs using 
time, place and phylogeny to detect transmission 
clusters. Combining the three dimensions allowed 
identification of clusters not detected by any of these 
variables alone. Possible spurious clustering could 
be detected, probably explained by the simultaneous 
endemic circulation of different E6 strains in the same 
geographical region and time, as has been described 
by other authors [40]. It is not very likely that cluster 
M corresponded to a true transmission cluster, given 
the high genetic diversity of the isolates (more than 
4 nt in 78% of the pairs), which fell within different 
phylogenetic groups, as well as the high inter-patient 
distances in time and in space. However, most of the 
transmission clusters fell within single phylogenetic 
clusters and were highly plausible. Separate transmis-
sion clusters of phylogenetically similar strains is most 
probably explained by two separate introductions of 
Figure 4
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the same strain or by a circulating strain causing two 
distinct outbreaks. Our transmission clusters were also 
concordant with previous outbreak reports. Cluster 
N explained the period of increased E6 circulation in 
2009. Interestingly, the nine clinical isolates identified 
as transmission cluster I corresponded to an outbreak 
that was detected between June and August 2016 and 
comprising 10 cases from the same province, of whom 
nine had neurological presentation; the 10th case from 
the outbreak was not in our study [10]. This supports 
the validity of our cluster detection method and high-
lights its usefulness for automated processing of com-
plex data. Timely detection could potentially contribute 
to an earlier response to these clusters. Although there 
is no effective antiviral therapy against EVs, case man-
agement, enhanced hygiene measures and vigilance of 
close contacts can contribute to control and limit the 
spread of potentially severe EV infections.
At the frontier of polio elimination, also some other 
countries have implemented environmental EV sur-
veillance [8,13,29,30]. Previous studies have demon-
strated the potential of environmental specimens to 
contribute to the characterisation of circulating EVs in 
general and E6 in particular [14,41]. Environmental sur-
veillance overcomes the reference bias present in clini-
cal reports. While clinical surveillance only captures 
severe cases for whom physicians seek microbiological 
confirmation, environmental data provides a broader 
picture of circulating EVs. On the other hand, this could 
result in identification of strains with low virulence and 
low public health importance. The detection of novel 
EVs in the environment can indicate emerging strains 
that may cause outbreaks in the short or medium term. 
In Finland, close genetic relatives of the echovirus 30 
strains that caused an epidemic in 2009 had already 
been isolated in the environment a few years before 
the outbreak [29]. A recent study in France found silent 
circulation of EV D68 in periods were no clinical cases 
were being reported [26] and in Greece, an E6 strain 
found in sewage water in 2006 was correlated with 
cases from an aseptic meningitis outbreak 1 year later 
[30]. This has raised the question of whether environ-
mental surveillance could serve as early warning of 
increases in EV infections in the population.
Environmental surveillance was able to capture emerg-
ing strains causing disease in human populations, as 
83% of all environmental isolates were clustered phy-
logenetically with clinical isolates. However, 45% did 
not belong to any transmission cluster and an addi-
tional 19% belonged to transmission clusters that did 
not include cases captured by clinical surveillance. Our 
results indicate that the usefulness of environmental 
surveillance for early warning of E6 is very limited, at 
least in contexts such as the Netherlands where E6 
circulation is established and active typing of clini-
cal samples is performed. The usefulness of environ-
mental surveillance could potentially be improved by 
increasing sampling frequency, although the feasibility 
and cost-effectiveness of such a programme is ques-
tionable. Also, usefulness as early warning could be 
Figure 5
































higher in countries where clinical surveillance is sub-
optimal or where E6 or other EV types are not endemic. 
For example, in Scotland, HPeV3 was not detected in 
the sewage sludge/sediment collected in Edinburgh in 
2009 and only appeared in sewage one week before 
the first clinical case was diagnosed in early 2010 [13].
One of the transmission clusters detected the spread 
of E6 within an asylum seeker centre. The average stay 
in this centre was between 3 and 7 days, while in the 
EEVS, the cluster was detectable during 3 weeks, indi-
cating subsequent transmission, rather than a unique 
shedder. Except in the sewage from the asylum seeker 
centre, this strain was not detected elsewhere, indicat-
ing that there was probably no transmission outside of 
this centre.
A limitation of our study is that the CEVS is based on 
voluntary referral of samples from clinical laborato-
ries [31]. Moreover, there are no standard criteria for 
seeking microbiological confirmation of suspected EV 
cases, and this is done according to the expert opin-
ion of the clinician in charge. This makes the system 
sensitive to variations in the frequency of EV testing, 
although we tried to control for this by analysing E6 
as a proportion of all EV. Finally, since there are other 
laboratories in the Netherlands performing EV typing, 
not all EV clinical identifications in the Netherlands 
were captured by this study and the exact population 
coverage is not known. Environmental surveillance in 
the Netherlands is optimised for poliovirus exclusion 
in specific areas and may not provide a good represen-
tation of the general population, especially since the 
area covered (the bible belt) is considered to be rela-
tively socially isolated and circulating strains can differ 
from other regions [24,32].
The VP1 fragment analysed in our study covered only 
270 nt. While EV types can be assigned with this frag-
ment, the fragment is too short to carry out a more in 
depth phylogenetic analysis. As such, the study only 
gives a first insight into possible clustering, which 
should be confirmed with complete VP1 sequencing. 
We used a 15% threshold for genetic homologues, 
which corresponds to the level of genetic variability 
observed in other studies. In Greece, in patients with 
CNS infection in 2006 and 2007, mean genetic distance 
between groups was 22% [8] and in Poland, includ-
ing also environmental isolates, nucleotide sequence 
divergence was up to 19% [41]. As a limitation of the 
time–place–phylogeny clustering algorithm, we used 
15% of the maximum distance as a threshold for clus-
ter detection, and the number and composition of the 
resulting clusters is sensitive to this choice. Using 
20% of the maximum distance or higher resulted in 
transmission clusters that were less consistent with 
the phylogenetic clusters previously defined, showed 
less plausibility and failed to identify the E6 cluster 
detected in 2016 [10].
Conclusion
Transmission clusters are reliably identified by 
jointly analysing time, place and genetic information. 
Therefore, increasing efforts should be made to col-
lect accurate time and place information within EV 
surveillance systems, along with genetic information. 
Automated algorithms can provide detection of such 
clusters and can potentially help control efforts to limit 
the spread of highly pathogenic EVs. Environmental 
surveillance proved to be valuable to characterise EVs, 
in this case E6, causing disease in human populations, 
but showed limited benefit for early warning for this 
endemic EV type.
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